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The Circuits Confused the Market: Why the Third Circuit's
Malack Decision Confirms the Need for a Uniform
Approach to the Fraud-Created-the-Market Theory
James Maruna*
I. INTRODUCTION
John and Jane Smith worked hard, and they saved up a small sum of
money over time. Jane's brother-in-law told the Smith's about a new
housing development project in which he recently invested. The mu-
nicipality would issue bonds to finance the project. John, knowing
how volatile the stock market was lately, thought that purchasing a
bond would be a smart investment for the family's nest egg. The de-
velopment company sent over some materials, which John skimmed;
after all, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) approved the offering. He invested and waited for results. Un-
fortunately for the Smiths, the development company lied about its
legal authority to issue bonds. The company had an attorney falsify
some documents that it submitted to the SEC. Predictably, the devel-
opment went under, and John lost his money.
Under a traditional securities fraud claim, the Smiths cannot re-
cover. The Smiths cannot prove that they relied on the misstatements
in the marketing materials to purchase the investment because John
skimmed rather than read the materials. Some circuit courts recog-
nize another theory of reliance called fraud created the market
(FCTM). FCTM expands traditional securities fraud laws and would
allow the Smiths to recoup their investment.1
Various circuit courts have accepted FCTM as a way to prove reli-
ance in a § 10(b) securities fraud claim. 2 In 2010, the Third Circuit
heard the case of Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP.3 The Third Circuit
* J.D., DePaul University College of Law, May 2013; B.A. Political Economics and History,
Tulane University, Aug. 2007. The Author would like to thank the editors of the DePaul Busi-
ness & Commercial Law Journal and especially Amit Bindra for their help in editing and prepar-
ing this Article for publication.
1. See Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1989); T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort
Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462
(5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
2. A § 10(b) claim is the principal mechanism by which a plaintiff may seek recovery for
securities fraud. See Ross, 885 F.2d at 723; T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1330; Shores, 647 F.2d at 462.
3. Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743 (3d Cir. 2010).
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rejected FCTM as an acceptable means of proving reliance. 4 The Su-
preme Court has not addressed the validity of FCTM. With the Third
Circuit's decision, three circuits allow FCTM and three reject the the-
ory.5 Due to this split, the success of certain securities fraud claims
depends solely on the venue where a plaintiff files the lawsuit.6 Plain-
tiff attorneys now have an incentive to forum shop.7
This issue is ripe for Supreme Court review. In reviewing FCTM,
the Supreme Court should adopt a partial application of FCTM based
on the Tenth Circuit's legal unmarketability standard. Under this
standard, a plaintiff will fail on her FCTM claim unless the plaintiff
can prove that the security issuer lacked the legal authority in the first
place to even issue the security. This solution prevents FCTM from
creating de facto investor insurance, which would increase frivolous
securities litigation.
II. SECURITIES FRAUD HISTORY
A. Development of Federal Securities Regulations
The development of securities fraud laws in the United States shows
a desire to protect the investor without going so far as to create de
facto investor's insurance. Prior to 1933, the securities markets of this
country operated under a laissez-faire doctrine." There was no federal
cause of action for securities fraud, and the purchaser of a security
operated under the premise of caveat emptor.9 In the midst of the
4. Id.
5. Compare Ross, 885 F.2d at 723, T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1330, and Shores, 647 F.2d at 462,
with Malack, 617 F.3d at 743, Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151 (6th Cir. 1994), and
Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 1993).
6. A plaintiff filing in the Fifth, Tenth, or Eleventh Circuit may raise an FCTM reliance theory
whereas that same theory is unavailable to a plaintiff filing in the Third, Sixth, or Seventh
Circuit.
7. Forum shopping produces a significant problem because it can increase the inconvenience
and expense of a defendant. Having to try a case in a distant jurisdiction at great cost may force
a defendant to settle a claim it would otherwise defend on the merits in its home jurisdiction.
See Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What's Wrong with That?, 24 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 25, 29
(2005).
8. Matt Silverman, Fraud Created the Market: Presuming Reliance in Rule 10b-5 Primary Se-
curities Market Fraud Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1787, 1793 (2011). A laissez-faire doc-
trine means that the government has little to no intervention in private securities trading.
9. Id.; see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984). Caveat emptor is Latin for "let the buyer
beware." BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 252 (9th ed. 2009). The purchaser of a security assumes
the risk and is responsible for any steps to minimize the investment risks such as performing due
diligence before investing. While caveat emptor was the prevailing view, that does not mean that
there were no securities regulations. As Easterbrook and Fischel discussed, all fifty states had
legislation forbidding fraudulent actions in connection with securities. Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 9, at 670.
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Great Depression, Congress sought to regulate the securities markets
for the first time. Congress intended the legislation to promote full
disclosure of a company's or a security issuer's financial information
and, therefore, provide enough information to allow investors to make
informed decisions on their own accord.10
To encourage disclosure to potential investors, Congress passed the
Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act)" and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). 12 These laws serve two main
functions. First, the acts prohibit an individual from committing a
fraud on the market.13 Second, the acts provide requirements for
mandatory disclosures when securities are first offered and for peri-
odic disclosures thereafter.14 The two acts function similarly but regu-
late different interests. The Securities Act regulates securities sold in
the primary market whereas the Exchange Act regulates a security
already offered and traded in a secondary market.'5 The primary
market is the initial market that all securities pass through when they
are initially made available to the public in an initial public offering
(IPO). In contrast, the secondary market is where the holder of a
security resells its shares to another interested investor. An investor
who calls her broker and wants to purchase a share of Google
purchases that share on the secondary market.
To further the policy goal of allowing investors to make informed
decisions, the Securities Act requires that companies disclose material
information regarding the offered security.16 Companies offer this in-
formation through a prospectus, an overview of the offering that high-
lights material information about a security.' 7 Investors use this
information to evaluate a security's potential reward against the secur-
ity's potential risk."' The policy is that an investor with more informa-
tion will make more informed decisions.
10. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006).
12. Id. §§ 78a-78pp.
13. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 670.
14. Id. at 669. Disclosure requirements include the following: "descriptions of the issuer's
business, past business performance, information about the issuer's officers and managers, au-
dited financial statements of past business performance, executive compensation, risks of the
business, tax and legal status, and the terms and information about the securities used." Securi-
ties Act of 1933, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edulwex/
securities act ofj1933 (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
15. Silverman, supra note 8, at 1793.
16. § 77g. Material information "means information that would affect a reasonable investor's
evaluation of the company's stock." Securities Act of 1933, supra note 14.
17. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.
gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
18. Id.
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The Exchange Act provides additional protection to investors.
First, the Exchange Act created the SEC.19 The SEC monitors the
security initially by requiring that companies present certain materials
in a registration statement before it is offered to the public for
purchase.20 Second, the Securities Act provides a cause of action
against an individual who violates the statute.21
B. There Are Six Elements for a Securities Fraud Claim
If a plaintiff wishes to recover from a company's manipulative or
deceptive practices in regulated securities disclosures, she may pursue
an action under § 10(b). 22 Judges refer to § 10(b) as a "catchall"
clause enacted to provide enforcement against fraud that the statute
does not specifically discuss. 23 Rule lOb-5 creates a cause of action
against individuals violating § 10(b). This cause of action tracks com-
mon law fraud. To prevail under a § 10(b) claim, a plaintiff must show
the following six elements: (1) a material misrepresentation; (2) scien-
ter; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reli-
ance; (5) an economic loss; and (6) loss causation. 24
To prove that a fraud took place, the plaintiff must indicate that the
information omitted or misrepresented is "material." 25 A fact is mate-
rial if "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important." 26 This definition is conclusory. The
courts provided additional guidance that "there must be a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the . .. fact would have been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix
of information made available."27 Unfortunately, this definition still
leaves some ambiguity as to when a fact is material. In cases where
the question is a close call, the practitioner should follow the Supreme
Court's general policy guidance: the threshold for whether or not a
fact is material is particularly high.28 This high threshold is based on
19. § 78d.
20. See Securities and Exchange Commission Forms List, supra note 17 (containing a current
list of information that must be disclosed when filing for a new SEC registration).
21. §§ 77a-77aa. The Exchange Act does not codify a private right of action. Instead, only
the SEC can bring action. However, courts have read a private right of action into the Exchange
Act since the 1940s.
22. § 78j.
23. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202-03 (1976).
24. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
25. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988).
26. Id. at 231 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
27. Id. at 231-32 (quoting TSC, 426 U.S. at 449) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Id. at 234.
[Vol. 11:545
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policy concerns. 29 Disclosure should provide investors with useful in-
formation so that they may make well-informed decisions. 30 A lower
materiality standard would produce the opposite effect. In order to
protect itself from potential litigation, a company's management
would provide every minute detail to the investor.31 A low materiality
standard would lead to investors being inundated with irrelevant in-
formation.32 This overabundance of minutia would cut against the
purpose of disclosure laws-to provide investors with information to
make well-informed decisions.33
The second element of a securities fraud action is scienter. 34 To
prevail on a securities fraud action, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant intentionally or willfully manipulated a disclosure to influ-
ence the security's price.35 Courts adopted scienter as an element in
securities fraud litigation by looking at the Securities Act's plain lan-
guage.36 Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to use or employ "any ma-
nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of" the
SEC's rules.37 In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court
found that the "words 'manipulative or deceptive' used in conjunction
with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest" that the statute pros-
cribes an element of knowing or intentional misconduct.38 The Court
found that the word manipulative in connection with the securities
market is essentially a term of art implying intentional or willful con-
duct designed to deceive or defraud investors by artificially affecting
the price of a security.39
29. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 672.
30. Id.
31. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231-32. For example, if it became necessary to disclose every potential
cost with a project, volumes of superfluous information about donut prices for the construction
workers and any information that may exist about a possible spike in the per donut price will
need to be disclosed to potential investors. After all, donuts are costs, and costs affect
profitability.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976).
35. Id. at 207.
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006).
37. § 78j(b).
38. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197.
39. Id. at 199. Some argue that the language of § 10(b) should apply to all actions, including
negligent actions. The Court dismissed this contention by citing to the legislative history. A
spokesman for the statute's drafters stated that § 10(b) was designed to be a "catchall clause to
enable the [SEC] to deal with new manipulative (or cunning) devices." Id. at 203 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). The Court reasoned that no drafter would use the words manipulative or
cunning if the intent was to create only a negligent standard. Id.
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The third element is that the fraud must be connected with the
purchase or sale of a security.40 This means that an actual transaction
must take place, as opposed to a situation where the plaintiff claimed
that the fraud prevented her from completing another transaction.41
The plaintiff must have taken an affirmative action with regard to the
shares. This rule is best illustrated by explaining the types of persons
that cannot bring an action: (1) an individual who decided not to
purchase a share because of the gloomy representations from the
stock's issuer,42 (2) an actual shareholder who alleges that she decided
not to sell her shares because the defendant issued falsely optimistic
projections or omitted actual negative projections, 43 and (3) others re-
lated to an issuer who suffered a loss in the value of their investment
due to corporate or insider activities in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities.44
The fourth element is reliance. 45 Reliance in this context means
that the plaintiff relied upon the defendant's material misrepresenta-
tion or omission and purchased the security only because of this mate-
rial defect.4 6 Practitioners sometimes refer to this as "transaction
causation" because the plaintiff must tie the transaction to the actual
misrepresentation. 47
The fifth element is economic loss. 4 8 This element is simply the
quantifiable loss that the plaintiff sustained because of the fraud.49
The sixth element is loss causation.50 Under this element, the plaintiff
must tie the economic loss sustained in the fifth element back to the
defendant's actual material misrepresentation.51
III. THEORIES OF RELIANCE
For a plaintiff to prevail on the reliance element, she must show that
she relied on a material misrepresentation or omission and would not
40. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 737.
43. Id. at 737-38. It may be possible for individuals in this class to work around this rule by
bringing a derivative action.
44. Id. at 738. Likewise, it may be possible for individuals in this class to work around the rule
by bringing a derivative action.
45. See infra Part III.
46. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1988).
47. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006).
49. Id.
50. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 342.
51. Id.
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have purchased the security had it not been for the material defect. 52
The most common method for proving reliance is offering actual
proof that the defendant's misrepresentation or omission induced the
plaintiff to make an investment decision she otherwise would not have
made.53 This proof is difficult to offer. First, individuals engaging in
deceptive acts are cognizant of the law and will take steps to conceal
affirmative evidence of their fraudulent activity. Second, providing
proof of reliance in cases involving multiple parties is difficult and ex-
pensive. 54 Because a security's market involves many investors, prac-
titioners bring suits as part of a class action. In these large cases, the
practitioner would need to produce a specific act of reliance for each
member of the class.
Plaintiffs can create a rebuttable presumption of reliance through
three methods, two of which are recognized by the Supreme Court.
A. Reliance Without Proof
The first method to prove reliance occurs when a party with a duty
to disclose omits a material fact.55 The Supreme Court articulated this
standard in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United StateS.56 The
Court held that to prove reliance all the plaintiff needed to show was
that the defendants withheld facts that a reasonable investor would
consider important when making a decision whether or not to sell
shares.57 Materiality means that a reasonable investor may consider
the information substantially important in making a decision.58 In Af-
filiated Ute, the defendants misrepresented the price that investors
would pay for the shares on the secondary market.59 Had the plain-
tiffs known the true value, they would have either not sold the shares
or asked for more money.
A plaintiff can establish a duty to disclose in a few different ways.
First, there are the traditional codified fiduciary relationships that re-
quire disclosure, such as a corporation's registration statement.60 Sec-
ond, the Affiliated Ute court held that where an individual essentially
52. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1988).
53, Michele D. Johnson & Colleen C. Smith, "Fraud Created the Market" Theory of Reliance
Loses Traction, PLI (Oct. 8, 2010, 9:58 AM), http://seclawcenter.pli.edul2010/10/08/%E2%80%9
Cfraud-created-the-market%E2%80%9D-theory-of-reliance-loses-traction/.
54. Id.
55. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 153-54.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 153.
60. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 17.
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creates a market for certain shares, she absorbs a duty to disclose ma-
terial information about those shares.61
While the Affiliated Ute presumption aids some plaintiffs, it has a
number of drawbacks. First, the presumption is not available when
the claim is based on a misstatement rather than an omission. 62 This
creates an incentive for a defendant to disclose everything and lie
about the numbers in the disclosure rather than risk omitting bad in-
formation. This does not prevent fraud.
Second, this presumption does not create a cause of action against
auditors or other third parties, like attorneys or auditors hired by the
company, who do not directly owe the plaintiff a duty.63 An auditor
owes a duty to the corporation that hires her to review the books.
This is troublesome because a company may seek to escape liability by
saying that it relied on the information provided by its outside auditor.
As the duty exists only between the auditor and company, the com-
pany would be the gatekeeper in determining whether or not it pur-
sues action against an auditor. In other words, a disingenuous auditor
could inflate the company's projections. A plaintiff could rely on that
information to purchase the stock, and when she sustains a loss, she
may have no cause of action.64
To expand a plaintiff's ability to prove reliance without actual proof,
the Supreme Court recognized a second method, the fraud-on-the
market (FOTM) theory. The FOTM theory assumes a free and open
market.65 This means that the market is so unencumbered by control
that, once a company makes information available to the public, in-
vestors incorporate the information into the stock's price.66 This in-
cludes all positive and all negative information about a company. If a
company makes misleading statements, the market will assume those
statements are true.67 This will cause the price of the shares to rise or
fall. Reliance is appropriate because in today's modern economy indi-
61. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153.
62. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION § 12.10 (5th ed. 2005).
Under Affiliated Ute, a company can claim that it has acquired literally all of the tea in China,
but so long as the prospectus discloses all of the information that it is required to disclose, it does
not matter if the information is filled with misstatements.
63. Id.
64. For example, the auditor could lie and say that a company with record losses had its best
year ever, and yet despite this egregious lie, because the auditor's duty is only owed to the
company that hired her, the investor would have no claim against the auditor. Only the com-
pany itself would have a claim against the auditor.
65. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1988).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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viduals rely on the market as a neutral hand to evaluate a stock's
price.68
A plaintiff must show three things to prevail on an FOTM theory.
First, the plaintiff must show that the information in question was ma-
terial.69 Second, the plaintiff must show that the market is efficient
because it contained a large number of transactions. 70 Third, a com-
pany must have publicly disseminated the misinformation.71
The FOTM presumption is rebuttable. Any showing that severs the
link between the misstatement and the price paid by the plaintiff will
rebut the presumption of reliance.72 The link can be severed in many
ways. First, a defendant can show that the market participants knew
the truth behind the misrepresentation; therefore, the misrepresenta-
tion did not affect market price.73 Second, a defendant can show that
the investor's reliance was unreasonable.74 An unreasonable investor
ignores known or obvious risks.75 The defendant can sever the link by
showing that the plaintiff believed the information was false but nev-
ertheless made the investment.76 In other words, FOTM does not re-
ward the investor who sticks her head in the sand.
While FOTM greatly expanded reliance theory, it still excluded a
large block of investors. The FOTM presumption assumes an efficient
market.77 An efficient market requires significant trading volume.78
The problem is that many investors purchase securities in markets
where there are a small number of transactions. In these smaller mar-
kets, there is insufficient transactional volume to assume that inves-
tors incorporated all public statements into the price.79 Therefore, an
68. Id. The presumption that every buyer or seller relies on the market's integrity is sup-
ported by the view that no one buys a stock to lose money. The Supreme Court rhetorically
asked, "Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?" Id. at 247.
69. HAZEN, supra note 62, § 12.10.
70. Id. The market must contain active transactions because this transactional activity is what
causes the fraudulent information to become absorbed into the security's price. If the market
has almost no activity, the security does not change hands enough times and the fraudulent
information is never absorbed into the price. Therefore, an investor cannot claim that she relied
on the price and that transitively she relied on the fraudulent information.
71. Id.
72. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.
73. Id.
74. Johnson & Smith, supra note 53.
75. Id.
76. Basic, 485 U.S. at 249; Johnson & Smith, supra note 53.
77. Johnson & Smith, supra note 53.
78. HAZEN, supra note 62, § 12.10.
79. See Brad M. Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Indicators of Com-
mon Stocks' Efficiencies, 19 J. CORP. L. 285, 291 (1994) (stating that larger volume of securities
trades ensures that the information will be quickly and accurately impounded in the security's
price). In these smaller markets, the security does not turn over as quickly as a larger, more
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investor in this type of market cannot prove reliance by saying she
relied on the market alone. This market is called an inefficient mar-
ket. Investors in inefficient markets cannot invoke FOTM.80 There-
fore, some courts have recognized a third type of reliance called
FCTM.8 1
B. Fraud Created the Market
FCTM creates an assumption that the availability of a security in
either an efficient or an inefficient primary market indicates that the
security is genuine and worthy of an investor's reliance. 82 Unlike
FOTM where investors rely on the integrity of the market price for
the security, in FCTM the investor relies on the integrity of the mar-
ket itself. In other words, the investor assumes that the market's very
existence is genuine.83 In FCTM, a market would not exist without a
defendant's misrepresentation. This is due to the fact that investors
do not make many transactions in these markets. Under an FOTM
analysis, the plaintiff needs to show that the market has sufficient
transactional volume so that a judge can declare it qualifies as an effi-
cient market.84 As discussed above, not all securities are purchased
on these active, efficient markets.85 Some securities are purchased on
smaller, inefficient markets. A plaintiff cannot raise an FOTM claim
in these smaller markets because there is inadequate transactional ac-
tivity for the security to have exchanged hands a sufficient number of
times and incorporate all public misstatements into the price.86 The
investor cannot claim that she relied on the misstatement because the
misstatement may not be incorporated into the security's price at the
time she purchased it. The inability to raise FOTM theory is often
fatal to a plaintiff's claim.87 As this limitation leaves many investors
developed market, so the investor cannot reasonably rely that by the time she purchases the
security all public statements have been incorporated into the security's price.
80. An example of an efficient market is the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) whereas an
inefficient market is the market for tax-free bonds on a municipal development. On the NYSE,
thousands of transactions occur each day by individuals reading, researching, and reacting to
public comments. In the municipal bond example, only a handful of transactions occur over the
life of the security, and the individuals trading the security may not know all information dis-
closed by the security's issuer. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the price of the bond en-
compasses all information, good or fraudulent, made about the security.
81. See Johnson & Smith, supra note 53.
82. Id.
83. Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 729 (11th Cir. 1989).
84. HAZEN, supra note 62, § 12.10.
85. See supra Part III(A).
86. HAZEN, supra note 62, § 12.10.
87. Id.
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with no legal recourse, some courts adopted the more expansive
FCTM theory.
FCTM allows a plaintiff to rely on the market's stability even if the
market is undeveloped.88 Since the Fifth Circuit first accepted FCTM
in 1981, the circuit courts have split over its application.89 The Fifth
Circuit, Eleventh Circuit, and Tenth Circuit recognize FCTM whereas
the Seventh Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and now Third Circuit do not recog-
nize the theory.90 Furthermore, the circuits that recognize FCTM do
not agree on FCTM's application and limitations. Courts analyzing
FCTM claims evaluate two criteria: (1) whether the defendant could
only market the security through fraud,9' and (2) whether the plaintiff
reasonably purchased the securities in reliance on the market. 92 A
security that can be marketed only through fraud is called "unmarket-
able," and the courts define unmarketable in three ways: (1) legal un-
marketability, (2) factual unmarketability, and (3) economic
unmarketability. 93
A security is legally unmarketable when, absent the fraud, the law
would not allow a regulatory agency to issue the security. 94 Few se-
curities can meet this standard. For example, suppose that a develop-
ment corporation attempts to raise municipal bonds to construct a
retirement community. For a court to find the bonds unmarketable
under this theory, the defendant must have falsified documents about
its legal authority to perform a construction project. Because it lacked
authority to complete the project, the municipality would never have
allowed the security to come to market.
Factual unmarketability asks whether or not the security is patently
worthless. Under this theory, a security is patently worthless when,
absent the fraud, some regulatory entity would not have allowed the
security to come on to the market at its real price and interest rate.95
In other words, courts must determine whether a regulatory agency
88. Id. A common market where the courts have applied FCTM is the market for tax-free
municipal bonds for construction projects. The market is limited to a small number of investors
who may not read all prospectus material.
89. Johnson & Smith, supra note 53.
90. Compare Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1989), T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v.
Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983), and Shores v. Sklar, 647
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), with Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743 (3d Cir.
2010), Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151 (6th Cir. 1994), and Eckstein v. Balcor Film
Investors, 8 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 1993).
91. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURYTIEs REGULATION § 12.10(6)(c) (6th ed. 2009).
92. Id.
93. Silverman, supra note 8, at 1808.
94. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1160.
95. Ross, 885 F.2d at 736 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
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would have allowed the security to come on the market at the fraudu-
lent price and interest rate if the agency knew all the relevant informa-
tion about the security at the time it released the security on to the
market. 96
Economic unmarketability is similar to factual unmarketability.
Both inquire as to whether or not a security is patently worthless.
Under economic unmarketability, however, a security is patently
worthless when no one would buy the security, even if offered at any
price.97 Thus, a security is patently worthless when no one would buy
it, even at a price as low as $0.01. This theory is problematic because a
security almost always has value, even if just salvage value.98
IV. CIRCUIT COURT OVERVIEW
The circuit courts created a complicated, inconsistent, and at times
illogical approach to FCTM. A practitioner raising a claim on an
FCTM theory must answer two questions. First, the practitioner must
determine whether or not the jurisdiction accepts FCTM. Second, if
FCTM is permitted, the practitioner must determine which un-
marketability theory the circuit court accepts.
Starting with the Fifth Circuit, several other circuits recognized
modified versions of FCTM.99 However, after the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Eckstein, every circuit to consider FCTM rejected the the-
ory.100 At present, six circuits have considered the question of
whether to allow FCTM.101 This split, combined with the inconsistent
definition of unmarketability, requires a universal, binding answer
from the Supreme Court. FCTM is ripe for Supreme Court review.
A. Circuits Accepting FCTM: 1981-1993
1. Fifth Circuit: Shores and Abell
In Shores, the plaintiff brought a class action suit against the entities
involved in approving construction bonds. The plaintiffs sought to re-
96. The two cases considering factual unmarketability, Shores and Ross, do not indicate how a
court makes this determination. Presumably, the value is adduced from expert opinions.
97. Id.
98. See id. (questioning the practicability of economic unmarketability since the likelihood of
any security having absolutely no financial value is essentially nil).
99. See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); see also Ross, 885 F.2d at 723;
T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983).
100. See Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Malack v.
BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743 (3d Cir. 2010); Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151
(6th Cir. 1994).
101. See supra notes 99-100.
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cover damages because the bonds that he purchased defaulted. 102 The
plaintiff contended that the defendants fabricated a materially mis-
leading offering circular103 that induced the municipality to issue the
bonds and the public to subsequently purchase the bonds.104 How-
ever, the plaintiff was not aware that the offering circular existed
when he decided to purchase the bonds.105 The district court consid-
ered this fatal to his claim.106 The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, re-
versed and became the first circuit to recognize FCTM.107
The Fifth Circuit adopted a factual unmarketability theory. 08 The
court agreed that the plaintiff's failure to read the circular precluded a
claim under the Rule 10b-5(b) provision, "unlawful ... [t]o make any
untrue statement of a material fact."' 09 However, the court allowed
the claim to go forward by looking to Rule 10b-5's general fraud pro-
visions.110 The court justified its holding by stating that securities laws
operate to give investors confidence in the market."' Therefore, it
makes sense to protect investors who rely on the market by punishing
those who abuse the investor's reliance.112 This minor distinction cre-
ated FCTM.
Seven years later, the Fifth Circuit defined unmarketable in Abell v.
Potomac Insurance Co.113 Once again the plaintiffs could not prove
reliance because they failed to read the circulars.114 The Abell court
noted that the bonds in Shores still had value because the company's
underlying assets still backed the securities at issue; however, the com-
pany in Shores was a sham because it never intended to start a viable
business. Therefore, the company could never generate enough reve-
102. Shores, 647 F.2d at 463-64.
103. An offering circular provides an investor with important highlights about the security
without the need to read the long-form prospectus. Offering Circular, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/terms/o/offeringcircular.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
104. Shores, 647 F.2d at 464.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 469-70; see also Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 736 (11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat,
J., concurring) (coining the Fifth Circuit's unmarketability standard as "factual unmarketability"
and previously presiding as a Fifth Circuit judge when Shores was decided).
109. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2012).
110. Specifically, the court looked at the general fraud language found in two sections of Rule
10b-5. First, Rule lOb-5(a) states, "unlawful ... [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud." Id. Second, Rule lOb-5(c) states, "unlawful ... [t]o engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person." Id.
111. Shores, 647 F.2d at 470.
112. Id. at 469.
113. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1119-20 (5th Cir. 1988).
114. Id. at 1117-18.
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nue to pay the interest on the bonds." 5 To avoid greatly expanding
FCTM, the Fifth Circuit adopted a factual unmarketability theory.116
Under this theory, a bond is unmarketable when at least one regula-
tory agency would have refused to issue the bond at the price and
interest rate that it actually was issued had the agency known of all
salient facts at the time of issuance." 7
2. Tenth Circuit
In T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel
Authority, a bond issuer used proceeds from the sale of construction
bonds for a variety of projects, none related to the actual purpose for
which the bonds were initially issued. 18 In fact, the Fort Cobb,
Oklahoma, Irrigation and Fuel Authority was not a valid public trust,
and Oklahoma law prohibited the company from issuing any bonds."19
The company had an attorney fraudulently pass on the validity of the
bonds.120
The Tenth Circuit allowed FCTM.121 The court adopted a legal un-
marketability theory.122 The court asked-If the defendant disclosed
all of the information, would a regulatory agency decide that the infor-
mation was so bad that the agency could not by law allow the security
to enter the market?123 The court reasoned that, at a minimum, secur-
ities law should permit the purchaser to assume that a legally existing
entity issued the securities.124 The court also commented that its hold-
ing would not create investor insurance because it applies only in the
narrow cases, like this, where the issuing authority had no legal au-
thority to issue a bond in the first place.125
3. Eleventh Circuit
In 1989, the Eleventh Circuit held that FCTM was permissible in
the case of Ross v. Bank South, N.A.1 26 In Ross, bond purchasers sued
115. Id. at 1122.
116. Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 736 (11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
117. Id.
118. T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1331-32
(10th Cir. 1983).
119. Id. at 1333.
120. Id. at 1331-32.
121. Id. at 1333.
122. Id.
123. Johnson & Smith, supra note 53.
124. TJ. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1333.
125. Id.
126. The Eleventh Circuit was created by splitting the Fifth Circuit in 1981. Ten judges who
heard Shores while on the Fifth Circuit also heard Ross on the Eleventh Circuit.
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a housing developer after the project failed.127 The developer planned
to use occupancy fees from the development to repay the bonds.128
The municipality required the venture to presell 50% of the housing
units before commencing construction.129 When the economy de-
clined, the developer waived the deposit requirements and "sold" the
units primarily to friends and family in sham transactions.13 0 After the
project failed, two investors sued for fraud.13' Of note, neither inves-
tor read the developer's marketing materials, which clearly warned
that the investments were "extremely risky."132
The court applied what is known as economic unmarketability.133
Even at salvage prices, the bonds had value, so they did not qualify as
unmarketable under this definition.134
B. Circuits Rejecting FCTM: 1993-Present
1. Seventh Circuit
In Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, a partnership raised money to
fund low-budget movies.135 The company needed to raise $35 million
to commence operations.136 The films flopped and the investors lost
money.13 7 Two groups of investors sued for securities fraud.'38 The
first group read the materials and invested because of the rosy reve-
nue projections.139 They argued that, "but for the misrepresentations
and omissions" of the rosy projections, the film company would never
have secured enough funding to meet the $35 million minimum.140
The second group consisted of investors that never read the prospec-
tus materials.141 Unable to claim reliance on the marketing materials,
they attempted to sue under an FCTM theory.142
127. Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1989).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 730-31.
131. Id. at 727.
132. Ross, 885 F.2d at 734.
133. Id. at 736 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
134. Id.
135. Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1123 (7th Cir. 1993).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1123.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1130.
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The Seventh Circuit rejected FCTM.143 The court found the fact
that the federal securities laws do not qualify as "merit regulation"
persuasive. 144 Simply, the security registration process does not ex-
amine the genuineness of an investment's projections. The mere exis-
tence of a security on the market does not mean that the security is a
good investment. 145
2. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit expressed significant concern with FCTM and, for
all practical purposes, rejected the theory. In 1990, the circuit first
expressed doubt in Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath.146 The court
declined to rule on FCTM in Freeman because of a procedural is-
sue.147 In 1994, the court declined to endorse FCTM in Ockerman v.
May Zima & Co.
In Ockerman, bond investors sued the developer of a housing pro-
ject and feasibility consultant for securities fraud. 148 The marketing
materials inflated the anticipated occupancy rates in the project's first
year and did not mention that the developer's two identical projects
produced results far below expectations. 149
The court expressed doubt about the viability of an FCTM claim.
The court reasoned that unlike in an efficient market, like the NYSE,
the primary market does not contain enough investors closely reading
marketing materials for someone to rely on the market being genu-
ine.150 Therefore, a presumption of reliance on the market itself is
illogical.151 The court also discussed the application of various un-
marketability theories. Economic unmarketability was not available
to the plaintiffs because the bonds were not completely worthless, as
evidenced by the project's later sale, albeit at a substantial loss. 152
The legal unmarketability theory was not available because the record
was silent as to any facts which would have required an issuing agency
to avoid issuing the bond had it known the true facts at that time it
143. Id. at 1130-31.
144. Id.
145. Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1131.
146. Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 200 (6th Cir. 1990).
147. Id. The proponent of the theory did not certify the theory on appeal.
148. Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1153 (6th Cir. 1994).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1160.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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issued the bonds.153 The court did not discuss factual unmarket-
ability.154
While the Sixth Circuit did not expressly reject FCTM, no further
cases in the Sixth Circuit have raised an FCTM presumption. Addi-
tionally, the Third Circuit in Malack and the Seventh Circuit in Eck-
stein characterized the Sixth Circuit as rejecting FCTM.155 For all
practical purposes, an FCTM claim in the Sixth Circuit is not viable.
V. THE MALACK DECISION
A. Facts of the Case
In 2010, a circuit court considered, for the first time in sixteen years,
whether a plaintiff may invoke FCTM in order to presume reliance.
In Malack, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff may not use FCTM
for reasons of practicality and policy.1 56 Malack and other investors
purchased notes directly from American Business over a two-and-a-
half-year period. 57 American Business promised to pay interest
above the prime rate on the notes, but the investors could neither cash
the notes nor find a market to sell them.s58 The company issued the
notes pursuant to its 2002 and 2003 registration statements and pro-
spectuses filed with the SEC.159 American Business hired BDO Seid-
man LLP (BDO), an accounting firm, to audit the opinions necessary
to gain SEC approval.160 On January 21, 2005, American Business
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and converted the pro-
ceedings to Chapter 7 liquidation on May 17, 2005.161 Malack and
other investors suffered substantial losses.162
Because American Business went bankrupt and had no assets,
Malack needed an entity to recover against. He filed a putative secur-
ities fraud class action against the accounting firm, BDO.163 Malack's
theory of liability was that BDO deficiently audited American Busi-
153. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1153.
154. See id.
155. See Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1130 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that in
Freeman the Sixth Circuit outright rejected FCTM).
156. Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 756 (3d Cir. 2010).
157. Id. at 745.
158. Id. American Business indicated that part of the high return was because the notes
would not involve underwriters or brokers in contravention of normal business processes for
issuing a security. Malack and the other investors seemingly ignored this suspicious behavior.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Malack, 617 F.3d at 745.
162. Id.
163. Id.
2013] 561
562 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 11:545
ness.164 If BDO had properly performed its job, it would not have
issued American Business clean audit opinions.165 Without clean au-
dit opinions, the SEC would not have let American Business register
the notes.166 Without registration, American Business could not mar-
ket the notes. 167 If American Business never marketed the notes,
then Malack and other investors would have never purchased the
notes and lost money.168
Malack wanted to bring a § 10(b) and a Rule 10b-5 action against
BDO. 169 Since proving reliance for each potential member of the
class proved costly and difficult, Malack invoked one of the three reli-
ance presumptions. The Affiliated Ute presumption was unavailable
because Malack targeted BDO, the auditor, and the Affiliated Ute
presumption does not allow a plaintiff to recover against a third party
without a duty to the plaintiff.170 The Basic FOTM presumption was
not available because it required an efficient market, and this small
market for American Business's notes did not involve enough transac-
tional volume to be considered efficient. Therefore, Malack relied on
an FCTM theory.
The district court declined to certify the class under an FCTM the-
ory and found that the proposed class did not satisfy the predomi-
nance requirement of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 171 As part of its decision, the district court found that the
proposed class was not entitled to presume reliance under an FCTM
theory.172
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Malack, 617 F.3d at 745.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are the principal securities fraud claims provided by the
Securities Act and the SEC rules. For more information, see supra Part II(B).
170. See HAZEN, supra note 62, § 12.10. The auditor has a duty to the corporation, not the
plaintiff.
171. Malack, 617 F.3d at 746. "Preponderance" tests whether the proposed classes are suffi-
ciently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. In order to determine whether com-
mon or individual issues predominate a case, the district court must formulate some prediction
as to how specific issues will play out at trial. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d
305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008). The district court assessed the likelihood that the parties could success-
fully meet all six elements of a § 10(b) claim and determined that meeting reliance was not a
likely outcome.
172. Malack, 617 F.3d at 746.
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B. The Third Circuit's Analysis
Malack asked the Third Circuit to embrace the Tenth Circuit's legal
unmarketability approach to FCTM.173 The Third Circuit rejected
this request and affirmed the district court's holding that Malack may
not presume reliance under an FCTM theory. 174 Specifically, Malack
argued that "common sense and probability" justified the Third Cir-
cuit to accept FCTM. 75 The court rejected both arguments.
First, Malack argued that common sense suggested that a security's
presence on the market indicated that the security was genuine.176
Therefore, an investor may reasonably assume the security is free of
fraud because it is on the market.'77 The Third Circuit disagreed. 178
For Malack's presumption to make any sense, some entity involved in
the process of taking the security to market must act as a bulwark
against the fraud.179 No such entity existed.
The parties involved in bringing a security to market all have incen-
tive to sell the stock at a high price.o80 If the security sells for a higher
price, they receive more money. Malack's common-sense argument
failed because the notion that self-interested parties would make deci-
sions that are burdensome and economically irrational ironically cut
against common sense.' 8 '
The SEC does not act as a bulwark against fraud because it does not
conduct "merit regulation."1 82 The SEC focuses on the adequacy and
clarity of the issuer's disclosures.183 At no time does the SEC deter-
mine the legitimacy of the security's price; nor does the SEC endorse
any of the documents involved in the security's issuance.184 In fact,
many securities exist on the market even though the issuer or some
third party made incomplete disclosures. 85 Therefore, Malack's com-
mon-sense argument failed.186
173. Id. at 749.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Malack, 617 F.3d at 749.
178. Id. at 752.
179. Id. at 749.
180. Id. at 749-50. The parties involved in bringing a security to the market include the pro-
moter, underwriter, auditor, and lawyer.
181. Id. at 750.
182. Malack, 617 F.3d at 750.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 751. Malack's counsel conceded at oral argument that if BDO had fully disclosed
all facts about the security, it still would have been issued on the market. The court reasoned
2013]1 563
564 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 11:545
Second, Malack argued for FCTM based on "the probability argu-
ment." 187 Malack did not supply the court with a definition of
"probability," so the court had to supply its own definition. The court
determined probability to mean that, because most securities on the
market are free from fraud, an investor may reasonably rely on the
high probability that his security is not tainted by fraud. 88 The court
rejected this argument. 89
The Third Circuit expressed concern that relying on the probability
theory would create de facto investor insurance that allowed an inves-
tor to recover her losses should the security decline in value.190 Per-
mitting Malack's theory would allow any investor to point to the
security's existence on the market, raise a fraud claim, invoke the
FCTM reliance presumption, and recover her economic losses.191 In-
vestor insurance does not comport with the goals of securities laws.192
Unlike the consumer-oriented legislation of the 1960s and 1970s, se-
curities laws leave investors open to significant potential harm.193
This cuts against the broad reading of securities laws for which Malack
argued. Therefore, the probability argument failed.
The Third Circuit also found that two other considerations weighed
against allowing FCTM. First, the court reasoned that FCTM does
not further the actual goal of the securities laws-informing investors
through disclosures.194 Citing prior Supreme Court decisions, the
Third Circuit noted that the purpose of the securities laws is promot-
that since the security would have gone to market with or without the allegedly fraudulent audit,
then no common-sense connection existed between BDO's audit and Malack's ability to
purchase the note.
187. Malack, 617 F.3d at 751.
188. Id. at 751-52.
189. Id.
190. Id. The theory works as follows: John buys a security in NewCo. John assumes that most
securities on the market are legally marketable. Therefore, John figures that there is a high
probability his security is legally marketable-not touched by fraud. As a result, the security's
presence on the market meets the § 10(b) reliance prong. The court expressed concern that
every possible security transaction would prove analogous to the above example and give rise to
a § 10(b) claim. Any investor could point to the security's existence on the market and claim
reliance. The insurance argument exists because a remedy for a § 10(b) claim is economic loss,
that is, the difference between what John paid for the security and the security's present value.
So if John bought the security for $1,000 and its present value is $100, John suffered an economic
loss of $900. Under a § 10(b) claim, John can now recover his $900 loss. The FCTM presump-
tion allowed John to make a § 10(b) claim that put John in the same position that he would have
been in had he never made the investment. Just like insurance, John is made whole and has no
loss.
191. Id.
192. Malack, 617 F.3d at 752.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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ing a policy of full disclosure to investors.195 Such disclosures place
investors in a position to help themselves by relying upon disclosures
that others are obligated to make.196 FCTM runs against this goal be-
cause it allows recovery for investors who refuse to look out for them-
selves.197 An investor has no incentive to read and consider material
because the mere presence of the security on a market gives rise to a
claim to cover the investor's losses.198 In fact, FCTM may go so far as
to actually encourage investors to keep their heads in the sand regard-
ing potential bad investments. A defendant can rebut an FOTM reli-
ance presumption by showing that the investor acted unreasonably
because she ignored obvious warning signs.199 Under FCTM, a savvy
investor would avoid reading any material on the security because the
less she knew about the security, the less likely that a defendant can
show that she acted unreasonably.200
Second, policy considerations supported rejecting FCTM. Recent
legislative and judicial actions narrowed the scope of § 10(b) liabili-
ties.201 The Third Circuit remarked that-when the Supreme Court
held in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Den-
ver, N.A. 2 0 2 that § 10(b) liability did not extend to aiders and abet-
tors-public calls emerged for Congress to enact legislation creating
such liability.203 Instead, Congress enacted the Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 204 which affirmed the Supreme
Court's ruling and limited actions against aiders and abettors to the
SEC.2 0 5 The PSLRA also heightened pleading and loss causation re-
quirements for "any private action" emerging from the Securities
Act.20 6 Finally, the Third Circuit noted that, in Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,207 the Supreme Court stated
that "the § 10(b) private right should not be extended beyond its pre-
195. Id. at 752-53.
196. Id. at 757.
197. Malack, 617 F.3d at 747.
198. Id.
199. See Johnson & Smith, supra note 53. While no court has held that the FOTM defenses
apply to FCTM, it is reasonable to assume that the same defenses would apply to FCTM. The
Third Circuit's concern that an investor may consciously avoid bad information about a security
suggests that the court believes the FOTM defenses would also work for FCTM.
200. Id.
201. Malack, 617 F.3d at 754.
202. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
203. Malack, 617 F.3d at 754.
204. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006).
205. Malack, 617 F.3d at 754.
206. Id.
207. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
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sent boundaries." 208 In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court recognized
only two accepted presumptions of reliance: (1) the Affiliated Ute
omission and (2) the Basic FOTM.209 The Third Circuit found the
Supreme Court's omission of FCTM meant that FCTM was not a per-
missible reliance presumption. 210
Finally, the Third Circuit discussed litigation costs as a policy con-
sideration that weighed against allowing FCTM.211 The court noted
that § 10(b) litigation carries extremely high costs for all parties in-
volved and that those costs are eventually passed down to consumers
through higher fees for services.212 Also, high litigation costs pressure
defendants into settling frivolous litigation.213
Finally, the Third Circuit considered what would happen if it en-
dorsed FCTM and applied Malack's facts to the Tenth Circuit's legal
unmarketability theory. The court held that Malack's claim still
failed.214 Under legal unmarketability, a plaintiff may invoke FCTM
if the security was not legally qualified to be issued.215 In TJ. Raney,
the company issued the security in violation of state law because the
issuer was not a valid public trust.216 Because the issuer never had
legal authority to issue a bond, the bonds were legally unmarket-
able. 2 17 In Malack's case, his own counsel conceded that the SEC still
would have allowed the securities to enter the market had the auditor
produced proper audits.218 Under the Tenth Circuit's test, only a se-
curity that cannot go to market may invoke FCTM as opposed to a
security, like Malack's, that should not go to market.219 Therefore,
Malack's claim failed under the legal unmarketability test.220
208. Malack, 617 F.3d at 754 (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 755. A basic economic principle is that there is no such thing as a free lunch.
Somewhere along the way, higher costs are incorporated into higher prices.
213. Malack, 617 F.3d at 755.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330 (10th
Cir. 1983).
217. Malack, 617 F.3d at 755.
218. Id. at 756.
219. Id.
220. Id.
THE CIRCUITS CONFUSED THE MARKET
VI. ANALYSIS OF MALACK
A. Correctly Interpreted Legislative Guidance
In 1995, Congress passed the PSLRA to curb the expansion of pri-
vate securities fraud litigation.221 Congress found significant evidence
of abuse in private securities lawsuits.222 Specifically, Congress found
that plaintiffs filed lawsuits whenever a security's price changed signif-
icantly and that these lawsuits created high discovery costs that forced
defendants into settling meritless claims.223
The PSLRA amended securities fraud laws to require a heightened
pleading standard for a securities fraud claim.224 Under the new stan-
dard, a plaintiff must plead each element of the claim with particular-
ity.225 A complaint that is not pleaded with particularity can be
dismissed at the end of the pleadings stage and before discovery be-
gins. As 80% of litigation costs occur during discovery in securities
fraud cases, early dismissal should lower defense costs and prevent
rising litigation costs from forcing defendants to settle meritless
claims.226
In order to avoid the heightened pleading standards, plaintiff attor-
neys started filing their securities fraud class actions in state courts.227
Congress then enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998 (SLUSA), which required plaintiffs to file certain securi-
ties class actions in federal courts. 228
The Third Circuit correctly commented that the current legislative
trend is to curb the growth of securities fraud litigation. For example,
Congress enacted the PSLRA to limit private securities actions.
When plaintiff attorneys found a loophole around the heightened
pleading standards, Congress enacted SLUSA to close that loophole.
The closing of the loophole provides clear evidence that Congress in-
tended to make certain that no securities fraud class action could es-
cape the increased scrutiny of the PSLRA's heightened pleading
221. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
730.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 41.
225. Id. Note that a particularity pleading standard was already required under Rule 9(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Congress determined that judges
were reluctant to dismiss securities fraud cases under Rule 9(b), so it enacted the PSLRA to
provide additional statutory support for the early dismissal of frivolous claims. H.R. REP. No.
104-369, at 32.
226. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 37.
227. H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
228. Id.
2013] 567
568 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:545
standard. The Third Circuit correctly commented that the PSLRA
and SLUSA evidence a legislative climate seeking to chill the expan-
sion of securities lawsuits. However, congressional intentions are per-
suasive, not binding. While the court correctly commented on the
legislative climate, it incorrectly interpreted the Supreme Court's
post-PSLRA jurisprudence.
B. Incorrectly Interpreted Judicial Guidance
The Third Circuit incorrectly held that the Supreme Court's Stoner-
idge decision foreclosed a claim raised under an FCTM theory. 229 In
Stoneridge, the Supreme Court confirmed that two reliance theories
are permissible in securities fraud litigation: the Affiliated Ute omis-
sion and the Basic FOTM.230 The Stoneridge plaintiffs based their
claim on a version of FOTM called "scheme liability."231 This theory
would allow the plaintiffs to raise FOTM even though the defendant
made no public misstatement.232 The Court declined to extend
FOTM.233 The Court reasoned that since Congress enacted the
PSLRA to limit the expansion of private securities fraud litigation, the
Court should decline to accept any new theories that expand private
securities fraud litigation beyond what existed in 1995, the year Con-
gress passed the PSLRA. 234 The scheme liability expansion that the
Stoneridge plaintiffs sought did not exist prior to 1995 and, therefore,
was impermissible.
The Third Circuit incorrectly interpreted this holding to mean that
any reliance theory not endorsed by the Supreme Court before 1995
was not permissible. The Supreme Court expressly recognized the Af-
filiated Ute omission and the Basic FOTM theories in the Stoneridge
opinion, but the Court never stated that those were the only two reli-
229. Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 754 (3d Cir. 2010).
230. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008).
231. Id. Scheme liability exists when a party engages in conduct with the purpose and effect
of creating a false appearance of a material fact to further a scheme. In Stoneridge, Charter
Communications purchased cable boxes from its supplier, Scientific-Atlanta, at a higher price
and then had the supplier use the surplus money to purchase advertising from Charter. Charter
then had its accountant, Arthur Andersen, record that purchase as revenue. This made it look
like the company met projected revenue targets when it in fact fell short. FOTM requires a
public misstatement. The problem petitioner faced was that the entire agreement was never
disclosed to the public. Petitioner argued that a public financial statement issued by Arthur
Andersen, even though it contained correct accounting figures, actually contained misstatements
because the means used to produce the figures were the result of a behind-the-scenes scheme.
As the statement was public, the petitioners argued that it constituted a public misstatement that
allowed them to invoke FOTM. Id. at 154.
232. Id. at 159.
233. Id. at 165.
234. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165-66.
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ance theories available.235 A recent article on FCTM argued that
Stoneridge does not preclude an FCTM claim because the Court never
considered a claim based on FCTM or other reliance theories in de-
ciding Stoneridge.236 The article suggests that the Court merely con-
firmed its prior jurisprudence on the matter without outright rejecting
any possible expansion of permissible reliance theories.237 The lan-
guage of Stoneridge lends this argument further support. Stoneridge
said that the PSLRA cautioned against the acceptance of any new se-
curities fraud theories developed after 1995.238 FCTM existed as a
legal theory since 1981, well before 1995.239 The decision did not say
that only theories recognized by the Supreme Court prior to 1995 are
permissible. The Supreme Court has never expressly dismissed
FCTM as a viable theory. The Third Circuit erred in finding that
Stoneridge precluded Malack's FCTM claim.
VII. IMPACT
After Malack, a securities claim based on FCTM succeeds in three
circuits, fails in three circuits, and is a gamble in the remaining circuits.
A rational lawyer will seek to raise the best case possible. In the class
action context, that would undoubtedly mean raising a reliance pre-
sumption based on the two theories the Supreme Court expressly rec-
ognized: the Affiliated Ute omission or the Basic FOTM. Not every
case contains a set of facts that supports either of these theories.
Sometimes a claim must rely on FCTM. Since the federal jurispru-
dence on FCTM is inconsistent, plaintiff attorneys will flock to the
Fifth Circuit, Tenth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit to file their FCTM
claims. This creates forum shopping.
A. The Supreme Court Should Articulate
a Clear Standard for FCTM
The Supreme Court should create a uniform standard for FCTM to
avoid forum shopping. Forum shopping is unwanted because it raises
litigation costs by forcing defendants to defend cases in venues far
away from the home office. 2 4 0 Forum shopping creates higher costs
235. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Fraud Created the Market, 63 ALA. L.
REv. 275, 301-02 (2012) (arguing that FCTM and other reliance theories argued in the circuit
courts were not considered by the Court).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 155-56.
239. See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
240. See Maloy, supra note 7.
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that run counter to one of the PSLRA's goals: reducing high litigation
costs that force defendants to settle weak claims.241
A uniform, national standard for FCTM will lower litigation costs
and promote judicial efficiency.242 Prior to 1933, every state had a
rule against fraud.243 The federal statutes were created, in part, to
increase judicial efficiency and decrease litigation costs. 244 The fed-
eral securities laws created a clear standard. Attorneys and judges
only needed to learn one set of laws, rather than fifty separate state
statutes. This lowered trial preparation costs. Since securities cases
involved one set of laws, a compendium of judicial case law developed
that improved nationwide consistency in the interpretation and adju-
dication of securities laws. For example, the case law on securities law
is so voluminous that a securities attorney knows what facts he must
plead to show the element of scienter in a § 10(b) claim. This lowers
litigation costs because he does not need to spend time researching
several inconsistent cases. It also saves the courts time because they
do not have to review multiple briefs and arguments on the subject
because the case law is clear. A Supreme Court decision on FCTM
will create a uniform standard that lowers litigation costs and pro-
motes judicial efficiency.
B. The Supreme Court Should Adopt FCTM but Limit It
to the Legal Marketability Standard
1. Why Adopt FCTM at All?
The Court should adopt FCTM because it can assist the SEC in
combating securities fraud in smaller, primary markets. The PSLRA
recognized a private right of action in securities fraud cases.245 Con-
gress recognized the potential assistance that private litigation can
have in affecting one of the Securities Act's goals: deterring fraud
through civil damage awards. 246 Most litigation on the primary mar-
ket involves class actions.247 This is because one claim alone may not
yield a remedy greater than the cost and time it takes to litigate a
securities case. However, if plaintiffs can aggregate their claims, then
the potential remedy increases. Should the Court decline to extend
241. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
730.
242. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 679.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (explaining that "[t]he private securities litigation sys-
tem is too important to the integrity of the American capital markets").
246. See id. ("Such private lawsuits . . . help to deter wrongdoing . . .
247. See Johnson & Smith, supra note 53.
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FCTM, it would mean that plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit would
need to show actual reliance on a misstatement for every member of
the class.2 4 8 This would decrease judicial efficiency because the same
element must be proven multiple times in court. Time and money
spent on litigation will increase. This will chill securities fraud litiga-
tion. Less class action litigation means less of the meritorious private
litigation that Congress recognized as beneficial in the PSLRA.2 4 9
Critics argue that the SEC can still bring a civil action in its own
name against companies that commit fraud.250 However, the SEC is
an agency that has limited resources.251 It must pick and choose which
cases it tries. FCTM is used in primary markets. Many of these cases
involve a smaller pool of investors than similar cases on the secondary
market.252 The SEC's desire to litigate these smaller cases is not as
strong as a group of investors who suffered personal losses because of
fraud. The cumulative effect of rejecting FCTM is that the individuals
that commit fraud, the very persons that the securities laws target,
may escape liability.
FCTM is not without its drawbacks. Most notably it can create de
facto investor insurance that incentivizes meritless lawsuits. There-
fore, the Court should not adopt a broad interpretation of FCTM. In-
stead, the Court should adopt the Tenth Circuit's legal
unmarketability standard because it will limit the circumstances in
which a plaintiff can raise a claim under an FCTM theory.
2. The Supreme Court Should Recognize FCTM Based
on a Legal Unmarketability Standard
The Court should recognize FCTM based on a legal un-
marketability standard. The legal unmarketability standard asks
whether the security's issuer had the legal authority to issue the secur-
ity in the first place, and, if not, whether the issuer lied about having
that authority.253
248. Id.
249. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31.
250. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
251. In the first quarter of 2012, the SEC filed only one hundred civil suits nationally for both
the primary and secondary markets. Based on the size of both markets, this is a very small
number. See Litigation Releases, supra note 17.
252. For example, a stock issued on the secondary market may have millions of shares circu-
lated daily. A security on the primary market may only involve the one-time purchase of three
municipal construction bonds.
253. T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1333
(10th Cir. 1983).
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First, it is reasonable to assume that a security's existence on the
market means that the business issuing the security had the appropri-
ate legal authority to offer the security in the first place. All securities
pass through the SEC before entering the market.254 There is no dis-
pute that the SEC does not evaluate a security's merits before releas-
ing it on to the market.255 However, the SEC's own website cautions
investors that the SEC does not guarantee the accuracy of a filing's
financial information.256 They provide no warning that information
outside of the financial disclosures, such as the company's legal au-
thority to issue the security, may be a fabrication. If the SEC warns
investors about only financial misstatements, why is it reasonable to
assume that an investor would ever think to verify information outside
of the financial statements? As the Tenth Circuit commented, "Fed-
eral and state regulation of new securities at a minimum should permit
a purchaser to assume that the securities were lawfully issued." 257
Second, legal unmarketability would not expand private securities
fraud litigation because the facts supporting a claim under this stan-
dard are rare. The circuit courts heard six FCTM cases, and only one
of the six gave rise to a claim that would survive a motion to dismiss
under a legal unmarketability standard. 258 The typical FCTM claim
occurs when an issuer makes a misstatement on a financial disclo-
sure.259 These claims would not survive under a legal unmarketability
standard. Under the PSLRA's heightened pleading standard, a legal
unmarketability claim will survive a motion to dismiss only if the
plaintiff can plead facts with particularity that the defendant lacked
the legal authority to issue the security.260 As the Tenth Circuit noted,
legal unmarketability gives rise to claims in a narrow context. 261 The
high pleading standard, combined with the narrow set of facts giving
rise to a claim, will cut down on meritless lawsuits. Legal un-
254. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9. This gatekeeping function is the mechanism by
which the SEC ensures that an issuer has complied with the Securities Act's mandatory disclo-
sure requirements.
255. Id.
256. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 17.
257. TI. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1333.
258. Compare TJ. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1330, with Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743
(3d Cir. 2010), Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151 (6th Cir. 1994), Eckstein v. Balcor
Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 1993), Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1989),
and Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
259. See Malack, 617 F.3d at 743; Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1151; Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1121; Ross,
885 F.2d at 723; Shores, 647 F.2d at 462.
260. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A) (2006).
261. T.J. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1333.
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marketability is unlikely to significantly increase securities fraud liti-
gation because few cases give rise to a claim under this standard.
Third, legal unmarketability encourages investor due diligence
before purchasing a security. An investor cannot rely on litigation as
a windfall to cover her potential losses because the high pleading stan-
dard and narrow set of facts make it very difficult to successfully raise
a claim under FCTM. This provides the investor with extra incentive
to research the company before investing her money. If the investor
could reasonably anticipate recovering her losses through litigation,
why would she take time out of her schedule to conduct due diligence
before investing? The limited availability of a legal unmarketability
claim will encourage investor due diligence.
Fourth, legal unmarketability is the only one of the three un-
marketability standards that has never been rejected by a circuit court.
In Eckstein, the Seventh Circuit rejected FCTM by focusing on the
Shores factual unmarketability standard. 262 Legal unmarketability
asks an entirely different question than factual unmarketability. Legal
unmarketability asks whether the security legally may be offered, un-
like factual marketability which asks what is the security's worth. The
Seventh Circuit never rejected an FCTM theory based on the narrow
legal unmarketability approach.
The Sixth and Third Circuits rejected FCTM by arguing that the
economic and factual unmarketability standards would broadly en-
compass most securities in the primary market, thus expanding securi-
ties litigation.263 Unlike economic and factual unmarketability, legal
unmarketability considers only misstatements as to the company's le-
gal authority to issue the security. It applies in a very narrow set of
circumstances. This limits the pool of potential claims and chills the
expansion fears of the Sixth and Third Circuits. The Eleventh Circuit,
which accepted FCTM, never addressed the legal unmarketability the-
ory.2 6 4 Six circuit courts have considered FCTM, and no circuit re-
jected the legal unmarketability standard.265
262. Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1132.
263. See Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1160; see also Malack, 617 F.3d at 752. Both courts distin-
guished their cases from the facts present in the Tenth Circuit's TJ. Raney decision and never
rejected the legal unmarketability standard.
264. Ross, 885 F.2d 723.
265. See Malack, 617 F.3d at 743; Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1151; Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1121; Ross,
885 F.2d at 723; TJ. Raney, 717 F.2d at 1330; Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).
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3. Why Not Economic or Factual Unmarketability?
First, adopting FCTM based on a factual or economic un-
marketability standard would expand private securities fraud litiga-
tion. Many courts reject FCTM because it may create investor
insurance.266 FCTM allows an investor to rely on a reliance presump-
tion rather than having to prove actual reliance on a misstatement.
Without having to show actual reliance, an investor can easily raise a
meritless claim for fraud anytime she loses her investment. 267 If the
security's value drops, for example, the investor can sue for fraud,
raise an FCTM presumption, and look to recover her loss. Investor
insurance expands frivolous securities litigation. Such a concern is not
present under a legal unmarketability standard. A plaintiff can raise
an FCTM presumption only if she can plead facts with particularity
that the defendant lied about having the legal authority to issue the
security. This is a rare set of facts. In contrast, factual and economic
unmarketability standards broadly allow a plaintiff to claim that any
misstatement, financial or otherwise, impacted the price. This greatly
expands the pool of potential FCTM claims.
Second, factual and economic unmarketability standards require a
showing that a security is worthless.268 In order to determine a secur-
ity's value, judges will need to undertake financial evaluations. Judges
are experts in the law. They are not experts in securities valuations.
Having a nonexpert make such valuations will lead to inconsistent
valuations of securities. Moreover, should the court seek experts, it
will increase litigations costs. Higher litigation costs will ultimately
trickle down to the consumers. The rules against fraud are most effec-
tive when enforcement costs are low and when it is possible to sepa-
rate truths from untruths.269 Legal unmarketability is the best
approach because it creates a clear, uniform standard such that a
judge can easily answer-Was the defendant legally authorized to is-
sue the security and did she lie about it?
266. See Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1162; see also Malack, 617 F.3d at 752.
267. See John M. Hynes, Comment, The Unjustified Presumption of Reliance for Newly Issued
Securities: Why the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 Rang the Death Knell for the
Fraud-Created-the-Market Theory, 38 Sw. U. L. REv. 333, 353-54 (2008) (stating that a concern
with investor's insurance is that it would lead to an increase in meritless litigation because inves-
tors would sue anytime that they suffered a loss even if they had no reason to suspect fraud).
268. See Ross, 885 F.2d at 736 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
269. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 679.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
FCTM is a controversial interpretation of federal securities laws.
Three circuit courts allow FCTM while three reject the theory. The
Supreme Court should review FCTM because the inconsistent appli-
cation of FCTM in the circuit courts will produce forum shopping.
The Court should adopt a narrow application of FCTM because it can
assist the SEC in targeting companies that defraud investors. The le-
gal unmarketability standard is the appropriate narrow application of
FCTM. It protects investors against the most egregious fraud while
narrowing the potential pool of FCTM claims to prevent clever inves-
tor's from turning FCTM into de facto investor's insurance.

